The Next Big Foreign Policy Issue?
President Vladimir Putin, speaking of the United States during his State of the Nation address, categorically stated: "Their house is their fortress - good for them. But that means that we also must make our house strong and reliable. We must always be ready to counter any attempts to pressure Russia in order to strengthen positions at our expense. The stronger our military is, the less temptation there will be to exert such pressure on us."
Although Putin’s speech focused primarily on domestic policy, his sharp words on the United States, or “Comrade Wolf” as he put it, offered little to interpretation – Russia would no longer concede to American political pressure. To many outside observers, Putin’s speech was immediately discounted as hardliner rhetoric, as hollow as the Soviet Union in 1989. Like many Russian (or Soviet) leaders before him, Putin offered nothing new. The United States is an international bully, and we will stand up to her.
So why should Americans be concerned this time around?
The answer, quite simply, lies in the inherent instability of the (new) Russian democratic system. Putin, according to the Russian constitution - which he has promised not to challenge - cannot serve another term. As such, his revamped foreign policy platform, established squarely in defiance of the United States and the larger Western paradigm, will fall into the hands of his successor. And a successor, mind you, that could a true hardliner – an ideologue, if you will – capable of acting in both word and deed. The United States, therefore, should not be concerned with Putin, but the legacy that he is consciously shaping with each speech.
And Russians are starting to listen. With each passing day, Putin’s promise of military expansion, coupled with the advent of increased government-sponsored domestic programs, suggests the early stages of despotism – and Russians aren’t offering wholesale objections. In fact, based on Putin’s popularity, they are quite satisfied with his administration.
The Russian people - and I emphasize Russia as a nation, not as a state - generally back the pseudo-institutionalized nationalist policies, and, if anything, press for more control. In a country where politically active citizens are used to total government domination, the idea of functional democracy can be unimaginably abstract. For an aging Russian who has suffered through the Cold War the fall of the Soviet Union, the promise of spontaneous national growth backed by military might is far more concrete than diplomacy and other "liberal" notions of development. Stated briefly, immediate power will always entice the majority.
Putin understands this, just as his successor will undoubtedly understand this. The present government will increasingly shift to the right just as the Russian people push it. In the next Russian election, I suspect Putin will be replaced by a man riding a pro-Russian, nationalistic platform to his inaugural address. That president will break functional diplomacy with the United States, thus undermining nearly twenty years of international integration and granting legitimacy to other regimes that stand with their backs to the West.
If this sounds familiar, it should. Putin already promised that "Russia would not return to the Cold War," and as anyone who’s been a teenager knows, absolving oneself of a crime they did not commit is rarely a good sign.
Although Putin’s speech focused primarily on domestic policy, his sharp words on the United States, or “Comrade Wolf” as he put it, offered little to interpretation – Russia would no longer concede to American political pressure. To many outside observers, Putin’s speech was immediately discounted as hardliner rhetoric, as hollow as the Soviet Union in 1989. Like many Russian (or Soviet) leaders before him, Putin offered nothing new. The United States is an international bully, and we will stand up to her.
So why should Americans be concerned this time around?
The answer, quite simply, lies in the inherent instability of the (new) Russian democratic system. Putin, according to the Russian constitution - which he has promised not to challenge - cannot serve another term. As such, his revamped foreign policy platform, established squarely in defiance of the United States and the larger Western paradigm, will fall into the hands of his successor. And a successor, mind you, that could a true hardliner – an ideologue, if you will – capable of acting in both word and deed. The United States, therefore, should not be concerned with Putin, but the legacy that he is consciously shaping with each speech.
And Russians are starting to listen. With each passing day, Putin’s promise of military expansion, coupled with the advent of increased government-sponsored domestic programs, suggests the early stages of despotism – and Russians aren’t offering wholesale objections. In fact, based on Putin’s popularity, they are quite satisfied with his administration.
The Russian people - and I emphasize Russia as a nation, not as a state - generally back the pseudo-institutionalized nationalist policies, and, if anything, press for more control. In a country where politically active citizens are used to total government domination, the idea of functional democracy can be unimaginably abstract. For an aging Russian who has suffered through the Cold War the fall of the Soviet Union, the promise of spontaneous national growth backed by military might is far more concrete than diplomacy and other "liberal" notions of development. Stated briefly, immediate power will always entice the majority.
Putin understands this, just as his successor will undoubtedly understand this. The present government will increasingly shift to the right just as the Russian people push it. In the next Russian election, I suspect Putin will be replaced by a man riding a pro-Russian, nationalistic platform to his inaugural address. That president will break functional diplomacy with the United States, thus undermining nearly twenty years of international integration and granting legitimacy to other regimes that stand with their backs to the West.
If this sounds familiar, it should. Putin already promised that "Russia would not return to the Cold War," and as anyone who’s been a teenager knows, absolving oneself of a crime they did not commit is rarely a good sign.
posted by Dr. Cook at 12:40 PM
1 Comments:
To that, I can only say "Vcyo Pootyom" - all is well.
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